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We consider multiple principal, multiple agent models of pure moral hazard. That is,
there is complete information about the types of principals and agents. Principals offer
allocations and agents choose non-contractible efforts, and payoffs are then realized.
Referring to recent researches on common agency games, we look for on the condi-
tions under which pure strategy equilibria characterized by direct mechanism are robust
to the introduction of richer indirect mechanisms.
We show that if principals use both stochastic allocations and private recommenda-
tions to the agents, direct mechanism equilibria remain equilibria when principals can
choose more general communication schemes.
We providetwo examples to show how both elements are necessary for the result. In
the ﬁrst example, we let a principal use recommendations but he is restricted to choose
deterministically his allocation. Then it exists an indirect mechanism that gives to him a
higher payoff. In the second example, we allow a principal to choose randomly among
allocation without sending any recommendation to the agents. Again, the principal can
improve his payoff by choosing an indirect mechanism. Finally, we discuss an example
provided by Peters (2004) in detail, since it appears to contradict our theorem. In this
example, Peters (2004) wanted to show that a pure strategy equilibrium characterized
with direct mechanisms could be not robust to the introduction of indirect mechanisms.
A critical feature for this result is that principals’ strategies are restricted to be deter-
ministic mechanisms. Allowing for stochastic mechanisms enables us to recover the
robustness of equilibria in the example and the coherence with our framework.
As menus theorems do not apply in multi-principal multi-agent models, and as the
methodology proposed by Pavan and Calzolari (2005) has not been yet extended to
multi-principal multi-agent games, our theorem can be one step forward toward a more
general characterization of equilibria in this framework.1
In the next section we start presenting the model.
1See Peters (2001) for a presentation of the menus theorems and a discussion of their extension to
multi-principal multi-agent games. Han (2006) extends these theorems to a restricted class of multi-
principal multi-agent games.
12 The Model
There are n principals dealingwith k agents, where n≥1 and k≥2. That is, we consider
a model with multiple agents. While the general model allows for multiple pricipals as
well, the single principal case is a special case of some interest, and will be the focus of
Sections 3 and 4.
Let Yj be a set of deterministic allocations available to principal j, with typical
element yj ∈Yj. An allocation can be, for example, monetary transfers, tax rates, prices,
or quantities, depending on the particular interpretation of the model. Each principal j




, the set of lotteries that can be generated over the
set of deterministic allocationsYj.
There is complete information about agent types. However, each agent i chooses an
unobservable effort ei ∈ Ei, where Ei is a ﬁnite set. Therefore, the model is one of pure
moral hazard. We denote the vector of efforts as e =
￿
e1,e2,...,ek￿
∈ E = ×k
i=1Ei.
We use the general communication structure for principal-agent models introduced
by Myerson (1982). Each principal j chooses a message space Mi
j (possibly the empty
set)and arecommendationspace Ri
j foreach agent. Werestrict Mi
j andRi
j to beﬁnitefor
each i and j. Let Rj = ×k
i=1Ri
j denote the set of recommendations principal j can make,
with Mj = ×k
i=1Mi
j, as before. After receiving the message array mj =
￿
m1
j,    ,mk
j
￿
from the agents, principal j chooses an allocation and a private recommendation to each
agent.





. That is, principal j may choose a stochastic mechanism, which provides
a lottery over allocations and recommendations for some message array mj. When the
choicerulepj isnotdeterministic, weassumethatthelotteryoverallocationsisrealized
only after agents have chosen their efforts. However, principal j chooses a realization
from the lottery over recommendations, and reports the realization ri
j to agent i. Po-
tentially, this allows a principal to induce a correlated equilibrium in the agents’ efforts
game.






denote the probability that alloca-
tion yj and recommendation array rj are chosen, given a message array mj. A mech-




. We denote by Gj the set of all
2available mechanisms to principal j. Let G = ×j∈nGj, with g a generic element of G.
Mechanisms are publicly observed, but a message from agent i to principal j, and a
recommendation from principal j to agent i, are observed only by i and j. As is usual
in the literature, principals commit to their mechanisms before agents send messages.




















denote the message strategy of agent i, where Mi = ×j∈NMi
j, and let




denote his strategy in the efforts game, where Ri = ×j∈NRi
j.
The time structure of the interaction is provided in Figure 1 and follows the one








Each principal j sends
recommendation ri
j
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Figure 1: Timing of the generalized communication game
Agent i’s payoff is given by the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function ¯ Ui(y,e)
and principal j’spayoffisgivenby ¯ Vj(y,e). Givenchosenmechanismsg, let p=×n
j=1pj
denote the strategies of the principals, µ = ×k
i=1µi the message reporting strategies of
the agents, and d = ×k
i=1di the agents’ strategies in the effort game. Also, letUi(p,µ,d)
3denote the expected utility of agent i given strategies p,µ,d, and V j(p,µ,d) the corre-
sponding expected utility of principal i.
In this complete information framework, a direct mechanism is deﬁned as follows.
Principals do not solicit messages from agents, and directly suggest the actions they
should take. That is, Mi
j = / 0 and Ri
j =Ei for every j =1,...,n and for every i=1,...,k.












In the special case of a single principal, a revelation principle holds (see, e.g., Myerson
(1982)). That is, any outcome (i.e., a joint distribution over allocations and efforts) that
can be sustained as an equilibrium in the agents’ effort game in an indirect mechanism
can also be sustained as an equilibrium of the agents’ effort game in an incentive com-
patible direct mechanism. In the direct mechanism, it is a best response for an agent to
“obey” the recommendation received from the principal.
It follows that the optimal direct mechanism is optimal in the class of all communi-
cation mechanisms. That is, an equilibrium of the game depicted in Figure 1 in which
the principal is restricted to choosing among direct mechanisms remains an equilibrium
of the game even when the principal is allowed to choose indirect mechanisms.
In thissection,weprovideexamplestohighlighttwofeaturesoftheconstructionthat
are necessary to sustain the revelation principle in the single-principal case: stochastic
allocations, and recommendations. Each of the two examples we consider has one prin-
cipal and two agents. In each example, we show the optimal direct mechanism, and
then show that, by privately communicating with one of the two agents, the principal
can sustain outcomes in an indirect mechanism that are not feasible in a direct mecha-
nism unless stochastic allocations (Example 1) and recommendations (Example 2) are
allowed for.
Example 1 (Stochastic allocations):
Consider a game with one principal and two agents. The principal can choose be-
tween two allocations, and each agent chooses between two efforts levels. Following
our notation, we haveY = {y1,y2}, E1 = {a1,a2} and E2 = {b1,b2}.
4The payoffs are given by the following matrices. In each cell, the ﬁrst element
corresponds to the utility of the principal, and the second and third to the utilities of









where x > 1.
Suppose the principal offers only deterministic allocations in any mechanism. A
mechanism is then characterized by:
˜ p : M →Y ×D(R),
where M is the message space and R the recommendation space. Hence, a direct mech-





For each of the allocations y1,y2, there is a unique correlated equilibrium in the agents’
effort game.
If the allocation is y1, the payoff of the principal is trivially 1, regardless of agents’
efforts. Agents play the following effort game:
y = y1
b1 b2
a1 (1, −4, 4) (1, 4, −4)
a2 (1, 4, −4) (1, −4, 4)
This game has a unique correlated equilibrium in which agents equally randomize be-
tween their two strategies. Hence, incentive compatibility if y1 is chosen requires that
the principal choose recommendations from the joint distribution that places a probabil-
ity 1
4 on each of the four effort combinations.
5If the principal chooses the allocation y2, the effort game is given by
y = y2
b1 b2
a1 (1, 1, 1) (x, 0, 0)
a2 (x, 0, 0) (1, −1, −1)
Each agent has a strictly dominant strategy (a1 for agent 1 and b1 for agent 2). Hence,
there is again a unique correlated equilibrium in which the principal’s payoff is still 1.
Incentive compatibility if y2 is chosen requires that r1 = a1 and r2 = b1, where ri is the
recommendation sent to agent i.
Hence, using a direct mechanism with deterministic allocations, the payoff of the
principal is 1. We now show that using an indirect mechanism with deterministic allo-
cations, he can do better. Therefore, stochastic allocations are necessary to sustain the
revelation principle.
Considerthefollowingindirectmechanism: M1 ={m1,m2}, and M1 =R1 =R2 = / 0,
where Mi is the message space of agent i and Ri the set of recommendations that may be
provided to agent i. That is, the principal communicates only with agent 1, and offers
no recommendations.
The principal uses the following deterministic allocation rule ˜ p: if agent 1 sends
message mk, the allocation is yk, for k = 1,2.
Since agent 1 does not observe any new information (i.e., a recommendation) after
sending his message, and agent 2 observes no information before choosing his effort,
the following simultaneous-move game is induced between the agents:
b1 b2
(m1,a1) (1, −4, 4) (1, 4, −4)
(m1,a2) (1, 4, −4) (1, −4, 4)
(m2,a1) (1, 1, 1) (x, 0, 0)
(m2,a2) (x, 0, 0) (1, −1, −1)
6In the absence of recommendations, agents play a Nash equilibrium of this game. We
now show that every Nash equilibrium of this game places a positive probability on the
outcome (0,0).
First, by inspection, we observe that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this
game. Therefore, in any Nash equilibrium, agent 2 must play both b1 and b2 with
strictly positive probability. Further, strategy (m2,a2) for agent 1 is strictly dominated
by (m2,a1).
Now, agent 1 must also be mixing in equilibrium (else agent 2 will not mix over
{b1,b2}). Suppose that in equilibrium agent 1 mixes over only (m1,a1) and (m2,a2).
Then, agent 2 must be playing each of b1 and b2 with probability 1
2 (else agent 1 is not
indifferent between his two strategies). But, against this strategy of agent 2, (m2,a1) is
a strict best response for agent 1.
Hence, in every Nash equilibrium of this game, agent 1 must play (m2,a1) with
positive probability, and agent 2 must play both b1 and b2 with positive probability.
Therefore, the outcome (0,0) has positive probability.
However, the outcome (0,0) provides a payoff x > 1 to the principal. Since the
payoff from every other outcome is 1, the expected payoff of the principal from any
equilibrium of the indirect mechanism strictly exceeds 1. That is, the principal does
strictly better with an indirect mechanism than with a direct mechanism.
Therefore, even withcompleteinformationand in thepresence ofrecommendations,
stochastic allocations are necessary for the revelation principle to go through. In this
example, the principal uses an indirect mechanism effectively to provide agent 1 with
private information about allocations, and create uncertainty about allocations for agent
2. This uncertainty, in turn, affects the strategy of agent 1 in the agents’ effort game,
leading to an eventual outcome that is not sustainable in a direct mechanism unless
stochastic allocations are permitted.
Strausz (2003) provides an example to show that, in a setting of pure adverse se-
lection, even with one principal and one agent, it is no longer true that any payoff im-
plementable by a deterministic indirect mechanism can be matched with a deterministic
direct mechanism. However, as Strausz shows, the principal always does weakly bet-
ter with a direct mechanism, so that the optimality of direct mechanisms remains in
7the single-principal, single-agent setting. He provides a further example to show that
a second agent with veto power may veto a direct deterministic mechanism and prefer
an indirect mechanism. Our example above shows that, with pure moral hazard and
two agents, the principal may strictly prefer a deterministic indirect mechanism to a
deterministic direct mechanism.
Next, we providean exampleto show that recommendationsare necessary to sustain
the revelation principle. In their absence, a principal can again do better with an indirect
mechanism than with a direct mechanism.
Example 2 (Recommendations):
Again, n = 1 and k = 2. As before, Y = {y1,y2}, E1 = {a1,a2} and E2 = {b1,b2}.
The payoffs are given by the following matrices. In each cell, the ﬁrst element
corresponds to the utility of the principal, and the second and third to the utilities of









Suppose that the principal offers no recommendations (so that R1 =R2 = / 0), but can
choose a lottery over allocations, so that y = py1 +(1− p)y2. Then, a mechanism is
characterized by p : M → D(Y).
In a direct mechanism, the agents’ effort game is as follows:
b1 b2
a1 (0, 0, 20p−10) (250p−200, 6p, 6p)
a2 (0, p, −10p) (4−14p, 1− p, 4p+6)
For p < 5
7, b2 strictly dominates b1. For p < 1
7, agent 1’s best response is a2, so that
the unique equilibrium is (a2,b2), with resultant utility for the principal 4−14p. Thus,
the principal’s utility is maximized at p = 0 and a value of 4. For p ∈ (1
7, 5
7), agent 1’s
8best response is a1, which results in equilibrium (a1,b2) and a utility of 250p−200 for
the principal. This has a supremum at p = 5
7, and a value of −150
7 .
When p = 5
7, agent 1’s best response is a1, and agent 2 is indifferent over b1,b2. The
maximal utility the principal can obtain is 0, when agent 2 plays b2. Finally, for p > 5
7,
the unique equilibrium of the agents’ subgame is (a1,b1), with principal utility being 0.
Hence, the optimal allocation for the principal is y1, with resultant equilibrium
(a2,b2) in the agents’ game, and a utility of 4 for the principal.
Now, consider the following indirect mechanism. The principal communicates with
agent 1, with the message space being M1 = {m1,m2}. The allocation rule, as in Exam-
ple 1, is ˜ p(mk) = yk for k = 1,2.
As in example 1, a simultaneous-movegame is induced between the agents, and can
be represented as follows.
b1 b2
(m1,a1) (0, 0, 10) (50, 6, 6)
(m2,a1) (0, 0, −10) (−200, 0, 0)
(m1,a2) (0, −10, −10) (−10, 0, 10)
(m2,a2) (0,10,0) (4,1,6)
The agents’ game exhibits the following unique Nash equilibrium:
• Agent 1 mixes between (m1,a1) and (m2,a2), with probabilities 3/5 and 2/5.
• Agent 2 mixes between b1 and b2 with probabilities, 1/3 and 2/3.
Thus, the principal’s expected payoff from the indirect mechanism is 316/15 > 4.
That is, the principal has a higher payoff from the indirect mechanism than is achievable
in a direct mechanism.
Allowing for recommendations, we can resurrect the equilibrium of the indirect
mechanism in a direct mechanism. A direct mechanism with recommendations in this
example may be characterized as a function p : Y ×E1 ×E2 → [0,1], where p(y,a,b)
is the probability the principal chooses allocation y and recommends effort a to agent 1
and b to agent 2.
9In the equilibrium of the indirect mechanism above, the resultant distribution over
allocations and efforts is p(y1,a1,b1) = 1/5, p(y1,a1,b2) = 2/5, p(y2,a2,b1) = 2/15 and
p(y2,a2,b2) = 4/15. Suppose the principal plays this strategy in the direct mechanism.
That is, the principals choose allocations and efforts according to p( ), and announces
the resulting recommendations to the agents.
It is straightforward to check that neither agent has an incentive to deviate, so the
mechanism is incentive compatible. For example, when agent 2 is told “b2”, his poste-
rior beliefs place probability 3/5 on (y1,a1) and 2/5 on (y2,a2). Given these beliefs, b2
is a (weak) best response. The principal obtains the utility 316
15 , as before.
In this example, the principal uses an indirect mechanism to communicate privately
with agent 1, thereby sustaining a correlated outcome over allocations and efforts. Such
correlation can be replicated in the direct mechanism only if the principal sends recom-
mendations.
4 Multiple Principals
With multiple principals, the principals are now playing a game with each other, and
their choices of mechanisms must correspond to a Nash equilibrium of this game. Fur-
ther, agents choices of messages and efforts must represent continuation equilibria of
the game, given the mechanisms chosen by principals and recommendations received
by agents.
We ﬁrst observe that, with multiple principals and stochastic mechanisms, agent’s
obedience of principals’ recommendations is a troublesome notion. An agent may be
recommended different actions by different principals. For example, if two principals
are both randomizing over recommendations, since principals choose their strategies
independently, there is a strictly positive probability that an agent will receive different
recommendations from the principals. Which one should he obey?
Given this difﬁculty, we bypass the issue of agents obeying recommendations re-
ceived from principals. Instead, for incentive compatibility with multiple principals,
we only require that, given the strategies of principals and other agents, agents play an
equilibrium of the effort game.
10Though there is complete information among principals, since agents receive pri-
vate recommendations from principals, agents may have private information at stage 4
(see Figure 1), when they play the effort game. Hence, in the spirit of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, we require that each agent j plays a best response following any recom-







Multiple principals introduce a new complication into the framework, since princi-
pals too must play equilibrium strategies in the mechanism design game. Since princi-
pals must choose mechanisms independently, there can be no correlation in the resultant
distribution over allocations in any equilibrium of a direct mechanism. However, as Ex-
ample 3 shows, such correlation can be induced in an indirect mechanism, if principals
privately communicate with the same agents.
Example 3: (Multiple principals and correlated allocations)
Suppose there are two principals and two agents. The allocation sets are Y1 =
{c1,c2} for principal 1 and Y2 = {d1,d2} for principal 2, and the feasible efforts are
E1 = {a1} for agent 1 and E2 = {a2} for agent 2. Hence moral hazard plays no role.
The payoffs are given by the following matrix
d1 d2 d3
c1 (1,1,0,0) (3,2,1,1) (−1,−1,0,0)
c2 (2,3,1,1) (1,1,0,0) (−1,−1,0,0)
c3 (−1,−1,0,0) (−1,−1,0,0) (−1,−1,0,0)
where in each cell the ﬁrst number represents the utilityof the ﬁrst principal, the second,
the utility of the second principal and the two last numbers indicates respectively the
utlity of the ﬁrst and the second agent.
Consider the followingindirect mechanism. Principals 1, 2 each offer thesame mes-
sage space Mj = {m1
j,m2
j,m3
j} to agent 1 and 2. Let M2 = R1 = R2 = / 0 (so that agent 2
is not able to send any messages, and neither agent receives any recommendations). The





1)=ci, and if any of the two agents send the message m3
1, he takes the decision












= di, and d3 if
one of the agents sends m3
2.



















with probability one. If one of the principal deviates, then
the agents choose to send m3
j to the no-deviating principal. Hence no principal has an
incentive to deviate. Let us remark that given the strategy of the other agent, such a
strategy is optimal for every agent.
This strategies guarantee to the agents a payoff of 1 and to the principals a payoff of
5/2.
The resultant distribution over allocations and efforts places a probability 1/2 each
on (c1,d2) and (c2,d1). Such a distribution is not achievable with direct mechanisms:
in any game in which principals 1 and 2 play independently. If the allocations (c1,d2)
and (c2,d1) are reached with positive probability, then the same must happen to (c1,d1)
and (c2,d2).
Let us remark that moral hazard plays no role in our example, hence recommenda-
tions do not play any role and cannot help to create correlation between decision as in
the second example.
This example illustrates a well known result in contract theory: whenever one con-
sidermulti-principalgames, theremayexistequilibriasustainedbyindirectmechanisms
only. In the exampleagent 1 acts as a correlation device, the resulting correlation cannot
be reproduced if principals play direct mechanisms only.
In the single-principal setting, every equilibrium of a direct mechanism can trivially
be sustained as an equilibrium of a direct mechanism that satisﬁes incentive compati-
bility. Hence, one implication of the revelation principle is that every equilibrium of a
direct mechanism remains an equilibrium when the principal is allowed to choose over
indirect mechanisms instead. We show that this implication goes through with multi-
ple principals, as long as the recommendations offered in the equilibrium of the direct
mechanism are uncorrelated with the allocations.








j is the set of recommendations principal j may make to agent i, and
pj : Mj → D(Yj ×Rj) is the allocation rule used by principal j.
A direct mechanism is deﬁned by (/ 0,E,pj), where pj ∈ D(Yj ×E). If the probabil-
ities over allocations and recommendations are independent, we say the recommenda-
tions are uncorrelated with allocations.
Deﬁnition 1 In a direct mechanism, a strategy pj of principal j has no correlation
between recommendations and allocations if there exist marginal densities pj,y ∈ D(Yj)
and pj,e ∈ D(E) such that pj(y,e)dy = pj,y(y) pj,e(e) for each y ∈Yj and e ∈ E.
A special case of recommendations uncorrelated with allocations is when recom-
mendations are deterministic rather than stochastic. For example, suppose that each
agent can put in a binary effort, say high or low. In addition, suppose that in equilib-
rium, each principal wishes that each agent choose high effort. Then, recommendations
are deterministic, and regardless of allocation strategies, satisfy our deﬁnition of being
uncorrelated with allocations.
In adirectmechanism,whenrecommendationsaredeterministic,thesameoutcomes
are achieved in equilibrium as if they were publicly observed. Since obedience has not
been assumed, the agents’ equilibrium strategies given deterministic recommendations
only need to be mutual best responses in the efforts game. That is, principals’ direct
mechanisms induce Nash equilibria in the agents’ effort game. Therefore, the over-
all outcome represents a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game in which principals
design direct mechanisms.
Let GD be the direct mechanism gameamong theprincipals. In this game, principals
may choose any direct mechanism at stage 1 (see Figure 1), so the strategy choice of
each principal j is restricted to pj ∈ D(Yj ×E). Let GG be the indirect mechanism
game. In this game, principals may choose indirect mechanisms as well, so that stage
2 (at which agents send messages to principals) may have a real role. Here, principal j
chooses (Mj,Rj,pj), where (with a slight abuse of notation) pj : Mj → D(Yj ×Rj).
In an equilibrium of either GD or GG , we require that (i) each principal plays a
best response, given other principals’ strategies and agents’ strategies, and (ii) each
agent i plays a best response for every recommendation array ri he may receive, given
principals’ strategies and other agents’ strategies.
13Formally,
Theorem 1 Suppose the direct mechanism game GD has an equilibrium in which (i)
each principal j plays p∗
j (ii) each agent j plays di∗, and (iii) for each principal j,
p∗
j has no correlation between allocations and recommendations. Then, in the indi-
rect mechanism game GG , it remains an equilibrium for each principal j to offer the
mechanism (/ 0,E,pj) and for each agent i to play di∗. Thus, the joint distribution over
allocations and efforts that obtains in the equilibrium of the direct mechanism game
remains an equilibrium outcome of the indirect mechanism game.
Proof.







j is his equilibrium strategy in the direct mech-
anism game GD. It is immediate that d∗ = ×k
i=1di∗ must remain a continuation equilib-
rium in the agents’ efforts game.
Hence, we need only to show that no principal j′ has an incentive to unilaterally





. Suppose, therefore, that some principal j′ has
an incentive to deviate to
￿







, while all other principals j  = j′










to these mechanisms, and the mechanisms and the agents’ effort strategies ˜ d induce a
(possibly correlated) distribution over allocations y and efforts e. Let ˜ n(y,e) denote this
distribution. Since agent j has an incentive to deviate to the indirect mechanism, his
utility from such a deviation,Vj(˜ n(y,e)) must exceed his utility from the equilibrium of
the direct mechanism.
Now, every principal j  = j′ is using recommendationsuncorrelated with allocations.
Since each agent i observes only the mechanisms and his own recommendation array
ri = (ri
1,...,ri
k), the efforts chosen must also be uncorrelated with the allocations of







y,j(yj) is the marginal distribution over the allocations of principal j, given his strategy
p∗
j.
Now, it is straightforward for principal j to induce the same joint distribution in
the direct mechanism game. Rather than play the strategy p∗
j, he plays the strategy ˜ nj.
14Since this strategy induces the same joint distribution over efforts and allocations as in
the continuation equilibrium of the indirect mechanism game, it must be a best response
for each agent i to obey the recommendation of principal j, and to ignore the recom-
mendations of the others (else agent i would have a proﬁtable deviation in the indirect
mechanism game, rather than playing ˜ d). But if every agent i obeys the recommen-
dation of principal j, and principal j plays ˜ nj(y,e) in the direct mechanism game, the
same joint distribution over allocations and efforts is induced as in the indirect mecha-
nism game. Hence, if principal j has a proﬁtable deviation in the indirect mechanism
game, he has a proﬁtable deviation in the direct mechanism game as well, contradicting
the assumption that p∗ = ×n
i=1p∗
j is an equilibrium of the latter game.
Remarks:
1. Peters(2003), Theorem1,showsthatinacommonagency(i.e., multiple-principal,
single-agent) setting, pure strategy equilibria of direct mechanisms are robust to
the introduction of more complex communication schemes. Our theorem above
provides an analog with multiple principals and multiple agents. Note, however,
that our setting is different from that of Peters (2003) due to the explicit use of
recommendations.
2. Our theorem uses the same intuition as that of Myerson (1982). Suppose ev-
ery principal uses recommendations uncorrelated with allocations in the direct
mechanism game, and one principal now deviates to an indirect mechanism. The
deviating principal may play a strategy which implies a correlation between rec-
ommendations and allocations. Nevertheless, it is incentive compatible (in the
sense of being a best response to other agents’ strategies) for each agent to obey
the deviating principal in the indirect mechanism game. Hence, the problem of
replicating an outcome from the indirect mechanism game in the direct mecha-
nism game reduces to the same problem as with a single principal.
3. There may well be multiple equilibria in the agents’ effort game. All we show is
that obeying the recommendation of the deviating principal is one such equilib-
rium.
4. The indirect mechanism game may have other equilibria in which more than one
principal offers an indirect mechanism (see Example 3).
15Importantly, our theorem cannot be straightforwardly extended to games with in-
complete information. The intuition is the following: even if recommendations are
uncorrelated with allocations, a recommendation from principal j to agent i may com-
municate information about the type of some other agent i′. This may lead to a corre-
lation between agents’ efforts and principals’ allocations, which is difﬁcult for a single
principal to replicate in a direct mechanism.
5 Discussion
In a recent paper, Peters (2004) provides two thought-provoking examples in a set-
ting with two principals and two agents. His ﬁrst example suggests that “In a multiple
agency environment [...] pure strategy equilibria are not robust against the possibility
that principals might deviate to more complex indirect mechanisms”.2 The second ex-
ample shows that a “no externality” assumption (see Peters, 2003) sufﬁcient to imply
the Revelation Principle in a multi-principal, single agent context fails to do so when
there are many agents.
We show in this section that his ﬁrst example can be reconciled with the discus-
sion above, if one removes the restriction to deterministic direct mechanisms. We ﬁrst
brieﬂy present the example, using Peters’ notation to keep the presentation as simple as
possible.
Peters (2004), Example 1:
As shown in Figure 2 below, the direct mechanism game begins with principals P1
and P2 simultaneously choosing allocations in the space Y1 = Y2 = {A,B}. In Peters’
framework, there are no recommendations. Thus, at the second stage, agents A1 and A2
observe the principals’ allocation rules, and simultaneously choose a level of effort in
the set E1 = E2 = {1,2}. For convenience, participation constraints of the agents are
ignored (it is easy to scale agent payoffs if necessary).
The game is summarized in Table 1. The principals’ choices affect which cell of the
larger matrix is chosen. The agents then play the 2×2 subgame in that cell. Payoffs
should be interpreted in the following way: the ﬁrst payoff is the payoff to principal 1,
who chooses the row in the big matrix. The second payoff is the payoff to principal 2,














Figure 2: Peters (2004), Example 1: direct mechanism interaction
who chooses the column in the big matrix. The third payoff is to agent 1, who chooses
the row in the inner matrix in each cell, and the last one is to agent 2, who chooses the
column in the inner matrix in each cell.
A B
A
e = 1 e = 2
e = 1 ∗ ∗
e = 2 ∗ ∗















































e = 1 e = 2
e = 1 (3,0,−1,−1) (1,1,1,1)
e = 2 (1,1,1,1) (0,3,−1,−1)
Table 1: Reduced form of the example in Peters (2004)
Principals’ decisions are restricted to deterministic offers. That is, principals are not
allowed to use lotteries over the allocations {A,B}. Given this restriction, in the direct
mechanism game in Figure 2, there exist three equilibria in the direct mechanism game:
• P1 and P2 both play B; A1 plays 1 and A2 plays 2; each player gets a payoff of 1.
• P1 and P2 both play B; A1 plays 2 and A2 plays 1; each player gets a payoff of 1.
• P1 and P2 both play B; A1 and A2 randomize and play 1 with probability 1/2; P1
and P2 both get a payoff of 5/4, A1 and A2 get a payoff of 0.
17This framework is used to show that if a principal can communicate with the agents
beforechoosinghisallocation, theﬁrst twopurestrategyequilibriadonotsurvive. More
speciﬁcally, Peters considers the case where P1 asks each agent i = 1,2 to send a mes-
sage mi










Whenever the agents do not coordinate on their messages, P1 chooses A. Since there are
no recommendations, we can think about agents choosing messages and efforts simul-
taneously.
If principal 2 continues to play B, the deviation p1 is proﬁtable for principal 1. The
continuation game associated with the strategies {p1,B} has multiple equilibria. In the
ﬁrst class of equilibria(referred to as E1), agents both report B (alternatively,both report
A) and randomize equally over efforts, inducing a payoff 5/4 for P1.3 In the second
equilibrium (E2) agents randomize equally over both messages and actions. That is,
they select each message–action pair with probability 1/4. These behaviors induce a
payoff of 17/16 for P1 and −1/16 for each agent.
Finally,thestrategyproﬁleE3 haseachagentrandomizingequallyoverthemessage–
action pairs (m1,1) and (m2,2). The corresponding payoffs are 19/16 for P1, 1/8 for A1
and −5/4forA2. However, E3 turnsout tonotbean equilibrium,sincethebest-replies of
agent 2 to the strategy of agent 1 are (m2,1) and (m1,2), instead of (m1,1) and (m2,2).
Nevertheless, the strategy p1 is a proﬁtable deviation in Peters’ example given that,
in every continuation equilibrium, the deviating principal earns a payoff strictly greater
than 1. In particular, the example emphasizes that the payoffs (1,1,1,1) cannot be
sustained at equilibrium when P1 is allowed to communicate with agents.
We now show that allowing for stochastic allocations in this example, even with-
out introducing recommendations, recovers the result that all payoffs associated with
principal 1’s deviation to pi1 can be supported using direct mechanisms.
3For everyplayer,this equilibriumis payoff-equivalentto the mixedstrategy equilibriumof the take-it
or leave-it offer game.
18To develop this argument, we ﬁrst observe that, in the equilibria discussed above,
principal 2 always chooses the strategy B. Thus, we can restrict our analysis to the
second column of table 1. We can therefore focus on the optimal action of principal 1,
and effectively interpret this example as a single principal, multi-agent game.
Suppose, in particular, that principal 1 randomizes equally between A and B (with
principal 2 playing B). Agents observe the stochastic allocation, but not the realization
of the randomization, before they act. Then, the agents are effectively faced with the
following continuation game, where the ﬁrst number in each cell is the principal’s ex-
pected payoff, and the remaining two numbers are the expected payoffs to agents 1 and
2, respectively.4
e = 1 e = 2
e = 1 (31/16,−5/4,1/8) (15/16,9/8,−1/4)
e = 2 (15/16,9/8,−1/4) (7/16,−5/4,1/8)
The agents’ subgame exhibits only a mixed strategy equilibrium, with both agents
equally randomizing over actions. This randomization yields the principal a payoff of
17
16, and the agents a payoff − 1
16.5
Hence, iftheprincipalisallowedtorandomizeoverallocations,theoutcome(1,1,1)
cannot be supported as an equilibrium in the direct mechanism game either (i.e., this al-
location results from a sub-optimal choice of principal 1, given the strategy of principal
2).
6 Conclusion
The literature on competing mechanisms with multiple agents often makes seemingly
restrictive assumptions about the set of mechanisms that are feasible for principals:
models focus on “take-it or leave-it” offers or direct mechanisms in which agents report
information about their preferences.6 We provide some support for this approach in a
4Since principal 2’s strategy is ﬁxed at B, his payoffs are ignored. As mentioned above, this is now
equivalent to a single principal, two-agent game.
5If participation constraints (e.g., a reservation of utility of zero for the agents) are a factor, note that
the agentspayoffsin eachcell ofthe originalgamecanbe increasedby 1
16 withoutaffectingthe equilibria.
6See for example Do˘ gan (2004), McAfee (1993), and Prat and Rustichini (2003).
19complete information scenario: equilibria deﬁned in direct mechanisms remain equilib-
ria in more general games in which principals can use richer communication schemes,
if one correctly deﬁnes the strategy spaces. Nevertheless, as shown in the common
agency literature,7 our approach does not allow to characterize every equilibrium of
multi-principal multi-agent games. If we focus on direct mechanisms, we may lose
some interesting equilibria.
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